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IN THE .SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BARTON KAY KIRKHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
c·ase No. 8684 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
/The defendant and appellant will be referred to as 
defendant. The plaintiff and respondent will he referred 
to as the State. .All italics are ours. 
The complaint charging defendant with the crime of 
murder in the first degree was filed on August 13, 1956. 
The preliminary hearing was held on August 22, 1956 
and defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(R. 2, 3). In the District Court defendant ·entered a plea 
of not auilty by reason of insanity (R. 50). The case 
was tried before the Honorable Martin M. L.ar.son, Judge, 
commencing on the 12th day of December, A.D. 1956 and 
at the conclusion of the case, after two and one-half 
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2 
hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of 
guilty of murder in the first degree without recommend-
ing leniency (R. 267). Thereafter, an appeal was per-
fected to this Court (R. 275, 276). 
THE FACTS 
The facts p~ertaining to the killing of David Avon 
Frame are largely undisputed. Briefly, they reveal that 
on the night of August 11, 1956, at approximately 
11:30 P.M. the defendant Barton Kay Kirkham entered 
a grocery store known as Nibley Park :Market located 
on the north east corner of 27th South and 5th East 
Street in Salt Lake County, LTtah, and while in the com-
mission of an armed robbery required David Avon Frame 
and Ruth Holmes \\ ... ebster to lay face downward on the 
floor in the back of the store and shot and killed them 
(R. 60, 61). Events of the evening leading up to the 
robbery and killing were as follows: The defendant had 
met a friend Sterle Pierce, in the lobby of the Hotel 
Utah where Pierce worked. Defendant \Yas \Yearing cer-
tain clothing \Yhich he had \Yorn in a robbery at Pueblo, 
Colorado. He had previously informed Pierce he would 
wear said clothing again if he ever perforn1ed another 
holdup (R. 33). After leanng the l1otel, defendant drove 
ai1nlessly around to,Yn and at approxiinately 11 o'clock 
P.l\f. encountered a group of young n1en in another auto-
Inobile. He followed the auto1nobile for som·e distance 
until the young 1nen pulled over to the curb and stopped. 
DefPndant droYe up alongside and said ''You fellows 
looking for a bP~ef~" He l1ad a gun in his hand (R. 47). 
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One of the boys asked him if the gun was loaded and in 
response he ejected a shell (R. 47). One of the young men 
testified that he "made us nervous and wonde-red about 
him" and, "Well, his words were quite - well, not right; 
I'll put it that way; for the circumstances, it didn't se·em 
right" (R. 52, 57). As defendant was driving ,away 
the boys took his license number and reported the inci-
dent to the Police (R. 52). 
Following the robbery and killing, as defendant was 
driving away he inadvertently shot a hole in his wind-
shield. Thereafter he abandoned the automobile ,and 
next appeared shortly .after midnight at the home of a 
Mrs. Bonnie Christean. H·e brandished the gun in he-r 
face and told her that he had just shot two people (R. 91, 
92). He asked if Mrs. Christean had an automobile. 
She informed him her son, Arthur, had an automobile 
and would r·eturn home shortly (R. 92). Before the son 
arrived her daughter, Shawna, came home from a date. 
He required Mrs. Christean and Shawna to remain in his 
presence until Arthur arrived (R. 95). During the wait-
ing period he told the Christ'ean.s that he had been an 
inmate of a Colorado prison (R. 95). When the son 
arrived, defendant ordered the son and daughter to get 
in the automobile. He told Mrs. ·Christean he would kill 
them both if she called the police. The Christeans a.t no 
time crossed defendant or offered any resistance to his 
instructions (R. 98, 105). Arthur drove the automobile 
and Shawna rode in the front seat while defendant rode 
in the hack seat with hi.s gun pointed at their heads. 
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Arthur talked quietly to him as they proceeded south 
toward Provo, Utah. At one point defendant stopped 
and purchased five dollars worth of gas. Defendant 
had Arthur turn the radio on and commented "that they 
didn't have the guts to put it on the radio." He also said 
he had killed two people, that "the woman had been hys-
terical and the man had tried to play hero" (R. 104). 
Eventually, defendant directed Arthur from the main 
highway up Provo canyon for a distance where he 
ordered Arthur to stop and get out of the automobile 
and start walking. Arthur obeyed. He fired a shot over 
Arthur's head and told Shawna "That is just to show you 
I am not fooling around" (R. 106). Defendant then 
orde-red Shawna to drive the automobile. She wa.s alone 
with the defendant for approximately an hour and a half 
(R. 106). During this time she did not attempt to argue 
or remonstrate with the defendant about anything but 
was submissive to him (R. 112). A short time thereafter, 
defendant and Shawna drove out of the canyon and 
defendant voluntarily gave himself up to the police. 
Deputy Sheriff Re·ed L. Rigtrup, who brought the de-
fendant to Salt I~ake, testified that defendant said he 
did it for an anniYersary celebration "~hich should have 
happened a 'veek later, but "tltat things came up suitable 
for it and I did the job that night." Officer Hunsaker 
testified that at no tilne did defendant sho'v any remorse 
or sha1nP, that he ahnost enjoyed telling the story (R. 
139). His fathPr testified that at the city jail .after the 
shooting, deft•ndant de1nonstrated no remorse or feeling 
of guilt or sorro'v (R. 180). 
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While incarcerated at the Salt Lake C'Ounty jail 
awaiting trial, at the instance of the Court, defendant 
was given a psychiatric examination by Dr. 'Clarence 
Craig Nelson, a licensed medical doctor and psychiatrist. 
The examination wa.s made jointly with Dr. Gordon 
Johnson who did not testify (R. 148). Dr. Nelson testi-
fied that mental and emotional disorders fall into four 
groups, first, psychotic reactions; second, charaeter dis-
orders; third, psyclrosom·atic disorders; fourth, psycho-
neurotic di.sorders (R. 142). He testified that when any 
one of the four above-mentioned types of disorders are 
of a serious nature, such condition can be re.adily de-
termined by a psychiatric examination (R. 143). He fur-
ther testified that character disorders ordinarily develop 
in childhood and that when such disorder is of a severe 
type, the individual suffering therefrom will feel no re-
morse or guilt over things that he does (R. 147). This 
condition is termed an emotional or mental illness. In 
this conneCition he testified "Q. Would you speak of a 
severe character disorder as a mental illness~ A. Yes." 
Dr. Nelson e·mphasized the fact that defendant "demon-
strated no remor.se" in describing the crime and that his 
comment was that he "w.asn't going to risk his neck over 
such a paltry sum" (R. 149). 
H·e stated that defendant was suffering from a 
mental illness consisting of a char:acter disorder of the 
severest type (R. 150). He testified that there are forms 
of treatment recognized for this condition and that with-
out treatment said condition would never change except 
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for the worse (R. 150, 151, 156). Dr. Nelson ·also testified 
th~t con.sidering the type of character disorder and 
mental illness defendant was suffering from, he would 
. sha-n,e 
not expect defendant to have a feeling of g : or re-
morse over commission of the crime (R. 158). He testified 
that a person suffering from this type of mental illness, 
when an obstacle is placed in his path, will usually re-
spond with some anti-social reaction (R. 158). On redirect 
examination the following questions were asked: 
"Q. Now, counsel has also asked you some ques-
tions concerning the patient's ability to dis-
tingui~h or to determine right from wrong; 
I will ask you whether that ability, in view of 
his lack of conscience - lack of remorse - is 
the ability which the normal person pos-
sesses. 
A. From strictly a thinking point of view, the 
ability would have to be thought of as the 
same. It would be done on the basis of his 
kno,Y1edge of right or \vrong, and not on the 
basi.s of a conscience or auto1natic control. 
Q. Fro1n the point of vie"T of his O\Yn justifica-
tion within hlmself of his own actions, what 
would you say~ 
* * * 
A. Well, he would feel that he \vas- though he 
kne\v this \vas wrong- he u·ould feel, under 
his U'ay of viewi·ng it, it 1cas justified, in 1ny 
opiu·£on" (R. 168, 169). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
There was an abundance of lay testimony to sub-
stantiate Dr. Nelson'.s diagnosis of mental illness. Bar-
ton Kay Kirkham was the oldest child in a family of five 
(R. 171). As a very young child he displayed a lack of 
:emotion. His father testified that when he was 6 or 7 
he would not cry vvhen he was sp.anked (R. 172'). His 
mother testifie,d that as a child defendant had no remorse 
or feeling of guilt about anything. He undertook school 
les.sons with the utmost reluctance and frequently 
sluffed. "He just couldn't stand ito have people talk to 
him and tell him what to do" (R. 172). When he quit 
high school, the excuse he gave his f:ather was that he 
couldn't s~tand th·e "yakkety yak" (R. 173). He tried sev-
eral different jobs and also spent a short time in avoca-
tional school with mediocre succes.s (R. 173). Thereafter, 
he enlisted in the Army Air Corps, first undergoing basic 
training at San Antonio, Texas, and then being assigned 
to the Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho (R. 174). While 
at Mountain Home he was given a temporary assign-
ment to England. In England he met a girl. After 
returning to Mountain Home he .asked his fruther and 
mothe~r to make arrangements to bring the girl to the 
United State.s. They put him off and this caused him to~o 
AWOL (R. 175, 186). He proceeded by bus to Pueblo, 
Colorado, and purchased a gun from a pawn shop 
and stole an automobile at gunpoint. He was almost 
immediately apprehended and sp·ent a number of months 
at the Buena Vista, Color~ado, reformatory. This was his 
only criminal record prior to the offense here involved. 
His parents visited him at the reformatory. He h:ad abso-
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lutely no remor.s-e or shame for his conduct (R. 175). Fol-
lowing his release from Buena Vista on probation, and 
a dishonorable discharge from the Army, he returned to 
Salt Lake City to live with his parents (R. 177). He 
arriv·ed June 1, 1956. From that date until August 11, 
1956, the· date of the robbery and killing, a number of 
abnormalities were noticed by his parents. He was highly 
agitated and ·easily excited. He would go to extremes in 
his voice, sometimes shouting tremendously at the other 
children (R. 177). On occasions he would come up behind 
one of the children, grab the child and give "a tremendous 
shout, scaring everybody" (R. 177). There was no humor 
attached to this conduct. He was suffering from a severe 
ab.scess on the end of the spine which caused him constant 
irritrution and pain (R. 177). In addition, he was suffer-
ing from a number of cavities in his teeth (R. 178). 
His mother observed that he wasn't adjusting to 
home life and discussed the need for psychiatric care 
with the family doctor, Stanley X eff, who was taking 
care of the cyst on defendant's spine (R. 189). 
A short time prior to the robbery and killing, defendant 
had 1net a S.alt Lake girl and after going "ith her for a 
period of time had told her about Iris criminal record. 
Thereafter, she refused to have anything to do ''ith hint 
and this disa ppointntent caused hun to beco1ne very 
morose and restless (R. 191, 192). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE 'TRIAL ·CO·URT CO·MMITTED REVERSIBLE E.RROR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHEREIN IT ADVISED 'THE 
JURY THAT THE TEST OF INSANITY WAS WHETHER 
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW HIS ACT WA'S WR.O:NG 
IN THE SENSE THAT SUCH ACT WAS CONDEMNED BY 
MORALS OR LAW. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL CO,UR.T COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERR:OR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
S'TRUCTIO·N NO. 3. 
ARGUMENT 
P.OIN'T I 
THE TRIAL COURT CO~MMITTED REVERSIBLE ER.R.OR 
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHEREIN IT ADVISED THE 
JURY THAT THE TEST OF INSANITY WAS WHE·THER 
DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW HIS ACT W ~S WRONG IN 
THE SENSE THAT SUCH ACT WAS ~CONDEMNED BY 
MORALS OR LAW. 
A portion of Instru0tion No. 9 reads as followS!: 
Instruction No. 9 
"Insanity i.s an element in determining ques-
tions of guilt of, or punishment for crime only 
when it renders the person so .affected irrespon-
sible or partly irresponsible, that is the defendant 
cannot be convicted of a crime, if, .rut the time 
of the a0t he was insane to such an extent that he 
did not know the nature of the act; that is did not 
know he had a revolver, th:at it may he loaded or 
that, if discharged, it may injure or kill; or that 
when he fired the shot, he did not know it was 
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wrong, in the sense that such act was condemned 
by morals or law; or that he was unable, by reason 
of mental disease, to control his actions or im-
pulses to injure or kill David Avon Frame." 
Couns:el for defendant took exception to the fore-
going portion of Instruction No. 9 and called attention 
to the error ·contained therein where he stated a.s follows 
at Record 240: "The foregoing quoted partion of the 
instruction carries with it the implication that, if defend-
ant was aware of the definition of murder, and of the 
fact that there was a law against murder and robbery, 
* * * he could not be insane, even though, although know-
ing the definitions of those offens:es and the fact that 
there were laws against them, within his own mind, he 
was convinced that the acts he was performing were 
ju_stified and proper. 
It is our position that, if he felt the acts were 
justified and proper, and l1ad no remorse for them, then, 
by necessary implication, he would not have sufficient 
kno,vledge of the rightness or 'vrongness of his actions 
to be legally sane." 
"\Vhere the trial court used tl1e tern1 '·in the sen;;e 
that such act 'vas conden1ned by n1ora2s or la"~: •it clearly 
instructed the jury that eYen though defendant's sense of 
1uorals "~as so perverted and distorted that l1e felt justi-
fied in doing the art. "~hich he did and l1ad no remorse 
for doing said aet, nevertheles.s if he had sufficient 
intellect to kno'v that the law forbid said act, he 'vas 
legally sane. That such instruction is incorr~t as an 
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abstract proposition of law will be cle1arly p~ointed out 
by the authorities hereinafter cited. That Baid error 
was prejudicial to the defendant becomes cle:ar when 
viewed in the light of the fact1s. 
An eighteen year old boy in commission of an armed 
robbery lays two pe.ople on the floor and shoots them. He 
harbors no ill will against them. In fact, he has never seen 
them before. No real or apparent necessity of self de-
fense requires the killing. No motive for th:e roberry 
exists except that the :vobbery is an anniversary celebra-
tion for a similar rash and nonsensical act that occurred 
a year before, and n~o motive for the killing i~s suggested 
except his statement to Dr. Nelson that he wasn't going 
to risk his neck over such a paltry sum. Yet Dr. N e~lson 
testified that defendant felt p~erfectly justified within 
hilnself in committing the killings and that in his opinion 
defendant genuinely experienced no remorse for his 
action (R. 168, 169). The te.stimony of the police officers 
and defendant's parents substantiated the fact that de-
fendant was so utterly incapable of understanding the 
moral implications of his conduct that he suffered no 
remorse or conscience whatsoever. The trial court re-
moved this whole body of both medical and l1a;y testimony 
from the consideration of the jury where it in.structed in 
effect that the sole and only requirement of legal s~anity 
was that defendant have sufficient me~nt.ality to know 
that his act was a:~ainst the law. 
The origin of the right and wrong test for determin-
ing legal sanity is the old M'Naghten's Case, (1843), 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
10 Clark & F, 200. A part of the M'Naghten opm1on 
ap·plicable here reads as follows: 
"Lord Chief J u_stice Tindal in his charge: 
'The question to be determined is, whether at the 
time the act in question was committed, the pris-
oner had or had not the use of his understanding, 
so as to know that he was doing a wrong or wicked 
act. If the jurors should be of opinion that the 
prisoner was not sen.sible, at the time he commit-
ted it, that he was violating the laws both of God 
and man, then he would be entitled to a verdict in 
·his favor; but if, on the contrary, they were of 
opinion that when he committed the act he was 
in a sound state of mind, th-en their verdict must 
be against him.'" 
A most scholarly discussion of M'Naghten'.s rule and 
the necessity of moral responsibility in application of 
the right and wrong test is to be found in the case of 
People vs. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 K.E. 945 (decided 
November 23, 1915). In the Schmidt case defendant was 
accused of killing a woman ·and dismembering her body. 
He confes.sed to th:e killing but entered a plea of not 
guilty by re1ason of insanity. He told the pl1ysicians who 
examined him that he had l1eard the \oice of God calling 
upon him to kill the won1an as a sacrifice and atonement 
and that he had co1nmitted the killing in the Yisible pres-
ence of God. The jury found lill11 guilty of n1urder in 
the first degre1e. Therea.fter, in a n1otion for new trial, 
his counsel filed Iris affidaYit stating that his story per-
taining to heavenly visitations '\Yas a shan1, that the 
'vonu1n had actually died fron1 a criininal operation, tl1at 
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her body had been dismembered and he had told a falS;e 
story in order to conceal the illegal operation. The court, 
speaking through l\1r. Justice Cardozo, found that cer-
tain instructions pertaining to the test of legal insanity 
were error but that in view of th:e fact that defendant 
had now conceded that the defense of insanity was with-
out merit, defendant was in no position to complain of 
the error on appeal. Jus!tiC'e ~Cordozo stated: 
"The learned trial judge said to the jury that 
'wrong' in this definition means 'con!trary to the· 
law of the state.' The jury w.as instructed in 
pointed and impressive terms, that even if the de-
fendant believed in good faith that God had ap-
peared to him and commanded the sacrifice of 
Anna Aamuller, and this belief was a delusion, the 
result of .a defect of reason, the defendant must 
none the less answer to the law if he knew the 
nature and quality of the act, and knew that it was 
wrong, in the sense that it was forbidden by the 
law of the state." 
* * * 
"We are unable to accept tire view that the 
word 'wrong' in the statutory definition is to re-
ceive so narrow a construction." 
Justice Cordozo then outlined the history of the 
right and wrong test. In discussing the M'Naghten case, 
he stated: 
"The definition here propounded is the one 
that has been carried forward into our statute. 
The judges expressly held that a defendant who 
knew nothing of the law would none the less be 
responsible if he· knew that the act was wrong, by 
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which, therefore, they must have meant, if he 
knew that it wa.s morally wrong. Whether he 
would also he responsible if he knew that it was 
against the law, but did not know it to he morally 
wrong, is a question that was not considered. 
In most cases, of course, knowledge that an act is 
illegal will justify the inference of knowledge that 
it is wrong. But none the less it is the knowledge 
of wrong, conceived of as moral wrong, that seems 
to have been established by that decision as the 
controlling test. That must certainly have been 
the test under the older law when the capacity to 
distinguish between right and wrong imported a 
capacity to distinguish hetween good and evil as 
ab.stract qualities. There is nothing to justify the 
belief that the words 'right and wrong,' when they 
became limited by M'K aghten's Case to the right 
and wrong of the particular act, cast off their 
meaning as terms of morals, and became terms of 
pure legality." 
The court continues: 
"We have still another guide to help us to 
a sound construction of ~I'Kaughten's Case and 
of the statutorv rule deriYed from it. That guide 
is found in th~ practice of judge.s by 'vhom the 
decision has been applied. -nT e refer to a few 
instances ~nnong n1any. In Reg. Y. Townley, 3 
Fost. &, F. 839~ ~fartin~ B., left it to the jury 
to say "\Yhether the prisoner lme'Y that the act ,,~as 
'contrary to the la"~ of God and punishable by 
the la"T of the land.' In Reg. Y. Layton, 4 Cox, 
C.C. 149, R.o}f(\ B., said that the jury n1nst de-
terlnine "Thether the prisoner~s delusion 'had the 
effect of HUlking hi1n incapable of understanding 
the wj e.kt'dness of n1urdering his 'Yife. · See also 
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Reg. v. Law, 2 Fost. & F. 836. In many cases, 
both in our own courts and in those of sisrter 
states, the language of Lord Mansfield in Belling-
ham's C.ase, 27 How. St. Tr. 636, is adopted with 
trifling changes, and the t~est is said to be whether 
the defendant understood that the act was for-
bidden 'by the 1aws of God and man.' People 
v. Waltz, 50 How. Pr. 204, 232; People v. Pine, 
2 Barb. 566, 570; Casey v. People, 31 Hun, 158, 
161. In Com. v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 
458, Shaw, Ch. J., in expounding the rule, as-
·sumed for illustration an ins.ane delusion that 
God had commanded a crime. He told the jury 
that a defendant, to be responsible, 'must have 
.sufficient power of memory to recollect the re-
lation in which he stands to others, and in which 
others stand to him; that the act he is doing is 
contrary to the plain dictates of justice ,and right, 
injurious to orthers, and a violation of the dict1ateH 
of duty;' and then, to explain the delusions that 
will relieve a man from criminal liability, he 
said: 'A common instance is where he fully be-
lieve.s that the act he. is doing is done by the 
immediate command of God, and he acts under 
the delusive but sincere belief that what he is 
doing is by the command of a superior power, 
which supersedes all human laws and the laws 
of nature.'" 
"In Guiteau's ,C;ase (D.C.) 10 Fed. 161, these 
words were quoted approvingly, and supple-
mented by other illustrations. The court. in-
stanced the case of a man known to be an affec-
tionate father, who 'insists that the Almighty 
has appeared to him and commanded him to 
sacrifice his child.' Of these and like cas,es, the 
court said ( p. 182) : 'If a m'an insanely believes 
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that he has a command from the .Almighty to 
kill, it is difficult to unde.r~tand how such a man 
can know that it is wrong for him to do it.' 
" 'Such a man is no less insane because he 
knows that murder is prohibited by human law. 
Indeed, it may emphasize his insanity that, 
knowing the human law, he believes that he .is 
acting under the direct command of God.' 
"'Cases may be found where, in explaining 
what is meant by knowledge that an act is wrong 
the courts have blended the elements of legal and 
moral wrong, but none, we believe, can be found 
in which the element of moral wrong has been 
excluded * * *' 
"To the reported cases in which the word 
'wrong' in the statutory definition has been used 
as importing a moral wrong, there may be added 
a multitude of unreported cases. As an illustra-
tion we may refer to a case recently decided by 
this court. People v. Purcell, 214 N.Y. 693, 109 
N.E. 1087. There the trial judge (Nott, J.) in a 
careful and able charge told the ju,ry that knowl-
edge of the nature and quality of the act has 
reference to its physical nature and quality, and 
that knowledge that it is zcron.g refers to its 
moral side: that to know that the act is wrong, 
the defendant must know that it is 'contrary 
to law, and contrary to the accepted standards 
of morality,' and then he added~ 1cith a slight 
variation of the u'ords of Lord Mansfield, tlzat 
it must be known to be 'contrary to the Tau's of 
God and man.' 
''In the light of ·all these preeedents, it is 
impo~ssible, we think, to say that there is any 
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decisive adjudication which limits the word 
'wrong' in the statutory definition to legal as 
oppos-ed to moral wrong. The trend of the de-
cisions is indeed the other way. The utmost that 
can be said is that the question is still an open 
one. We must, therefore, give that construction to 
the st'atute which seem.s to us most consonant 
with reruson and justice. T·he definition of in-
sanity established by the statute as sufficient 
to relieve from criminal liability has been often 
and harshly criticised. See e.g., State v. Pike, 
49 N.H. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533; State v. Jones, 
50 N.H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242; Parsons v. State, 
81 Ala. 577, 60 Am. Rep. 193, 2 So. 854, 7 Am. 
Crim. Rep. 266. Some .states re·je.ct it altogethe·r. 
P·arsons v. State, supra, and cases there cited. 
A recent case in Massachusetts (Com. v. Cooper, 
219 Mass. 1, 5, 106 N.E. 545) says that an offender 
is not responsible if he was 'so mentally dise~ased 
that he felt impelled to act by a power which 
overcame his re.ason and judgment, and which 
to him w3.;s irresistible.' That is not the test with 
us. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467, 11 Am. 
Rep. 731; People v. Taylor, 138 N.Y. 398, 34 
N.E. 275; Penal Law, para. 34. Whatever the 
views of alienists and jurists may be, the te.st in 
this state is prescribed by statute, and there can 
be no other. People v. Silverman, 181 N.Y. 235, 
240, 73 N.E. 980. We must not, however., exag-
gerate the rigor of the rule by giving the word 
'wrong' a strained interpretation, at war with 
its broad and primary meaning, ,and least of all, 
if in so doing we rob the rule of all relation 
to the mental he~alth and true capacity of the 
criminal. The interpretation p~laced upon the 
statute by the trial judge may he tested by its 
consequences. A mother kills her inf.ant child to 
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whom she has been devotedly attached. She 
knows the nature ·and quality of the act; she 
knows that the law condemns it; but she is in-
spired by an insane delusion that God has ap-
peared to her and ordained the sa.crifice. It seems 
a mockery to say that, within the meaning of 
the statute, she knows that the act is wrong. If 
the definition propounded by the trial judge is 
right, it would be the duty of a jury to hold her 
responsible for the crime. We find nothing either 
in the history of the rule, or in its reason and 
purpose, or in judicial exposition of i'ts meaning, 
to justify- ·a conclusion so abhorrent. No jury 
would be likely to find a defendant re:sponsible 
in such a case, whatever a judge might tell them. 
But we cannot bring ourselves to believe that in 
declining to yield to such a construction of the 
statute, they would violate the law." 
"'We hold, therefore, that there are times 
and circurnstances in which the word 'wrong' as 
used in the statutory test of responsibility ought 
not to be limited to .legal wrong." 
* * * * * * * * 
The r:a:se of a 1nother killing her infant child, 
hypoth·e:sized in a slightly different n1anner by Justice 
Cardozo in the Sehn1idt Case~ beca1ne a reality in People 
vs. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 4:27~ 3 ~.E. (~d) 581 (decided 
July 8, 1936). In the Sher,rood ease a n1other, after 
suffering a s·eries of adversities, dro,vned her infant 
child. She ea.rried the dead child to police headquarters. 
In ,ans'\vPr to questioning as to "~11~~ she killed the child 
she stHte·d: HI couldn't take ea1~e of hin1 any longer 
·and I thought he '\Yonld be be~tter off de~1d.'' .. A .t no 
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time was there any show of emotion on her part. At 
no time was there any .sign of regret. The defense of 
criminal insanity was interposed in the case. The court 
held that the trial court committed error by imposing 
the requirement not only that defendant did not know 
the nature and quality of the act committed but also 
that she did not know said act was wrong. The court 
stated: 
"In the main charge it was not made clear 
that a defe·ct of reason which inhibited a knowl-
edge either of the nature and quality of the act 
or that the act was wrong excused a person 
from criminal liability. At various points the two 
matters were referred to in the conjunctive, with 
the word 'and' instead of the word 'or'. The 
error was called to the: attention of the court 
at the close of the main charge, and the court 
said merely: 'If I made that error, I so charge.' 
Left in that w;ay, the distinction might doubt-
fully he considered as having been made clear. 
But thereafter-and it was the court's last word 
before the jury retired-the court upon request 
charged that a mere false belief would not be 
sufficient to excus·e her, 'unless it was the re.sult 
of some mental disease which prevented her fro1n 
knowing the n.ature and quality of the act and 
that it was wrongful.' Here was a rep~etition of 
the same error, complicated with a reference to 
'some men'tal disease,' i.e., some pathological eon-
clition, :instead of a 'defect reason,' as the 
statute reads. No disease, no pathological con-
dition, existed or was claimed to exist. It may be 
doubted whether the jury had a clear concep-
tion of when ,a person is or is not criminally liable 
under section 1120." 
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In the case at bar the jury w.as bound to find that 
"from strictly a thinking point of view" defendant was 
capable of understanding th~at the law forbid murder 
(R. 168, 169). However, the evidence would also support 
a finding that defendant was incapable of understanding 
the moral implications of the offense. In this connection 
we call attention to the language in the case of People 
vs. Purcell, 214 N.Y. 693, 109 N.E. 1087, cited in the 
Schmidt case, _supra, where it is pointed out that the 
nature and quality of the act test has reference to its 
physical nature and quality .and that knowledge of wrong 
test refers to its moral side; that to know the act is 
wrong the defendant must know that it is contrary to 
law, and contrary to the accepted standards of morality. 
Here the trial court has eliminated entirely the morality 
concept. The jury is told in effect that if defendant 
knew that hi_s acts were against the law he is legally 
sane. This is accomplished sin1ply by use of the con-
junctive or rather than the conjuncti\e and. But this 
error, as it did in the Sheru,ood Case_, supra, eliminated 
all moral considerations from the right and ''~ong test 
and left solely the I.Q. test of "~hether defendant was 
well enough ori~ented to understand tl1at there was a 
law .against murder. 
In /( earucy Y8. State, 68 ~fiss. 233~ S So. 292~ an 
instruction that the defendant "~as responsible for his 
.aet if the jury beliPYl'd at tl1e ti1ne of the killing that 
"th0 n1ind of the defendant "~as capable of knowing 
that if he shot the dece:a.sed not in his o'v11 self-defense, 
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he was committing an offense against the law of the 
1and, and it will not matter what the jury believes w:as 
rthe moral conception of the defendant of the act at 
the time," vV1as held to he such a departure from the 
right and wr.ong test as to be reversible. 
Although we have discovered no Utah case specific-
ally di.scus~sing the subject we believe that Utah adheres 
to the morality concept in application of the right and 
wrong test of sanity. 
In State vs. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 Pac. 641, de-
fendant w;rus accused of forgery. His defense was in-
s:anity. This court reversed -a conviction and as a matter 
of law held that the defense of insanity had belen erstab-
lished. The fact.s of the case reveal .a rem·arkable simil-
arity in mental condition between Brown and the de-
fendant here. 
"In detailing his conduci at the time of, and 
after, his ar.rest all the witnesses s.ay that he 
did not seem to realize that he had done any-
thing wrong; that he would insist in all apparent 
sincerity that he had done nothing wrong or to 
be ashamed of, and that his friends and family 
ought to be proud of him. It is further shown 
that after his arrest, and before his trial, and 
even :after having been convicted, he insisted that 
there was nothing to the whole matter; that he 
'(presumably meaning the officers) had them on 
the run,' or that he 'had them under hi.s thumb.' 
After his conviction he said that he 'had th~e~m 
now where h~e wanted them; that they would now 
have to come to him.' It was also made to appear 
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th:at during the first and the l:ast trial h-e did 
not seem to eare anything about the matter ; that 
he was wholly indifferent with respect to the re-
sult of the case, and when the jury found him 
guilty, he apparently was oblivious to what had 
occurred, ~and that he was in no way concerned." 
1The court then discusses the test of insanity as 
follows: 
"But if we assume that defendant intended 
'to forge the checks, which he no doubt did, this 
is not alone sufficient to make an insane person 
guilty of a crime. As \Vas well said by nfr. Justice 
Sullivan, Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 228, 78 N.W. 
509, 76 Am. St. Rep. 80: 'Such is not the law 
* * * Ordinarily insane persons comprehend the 
nature of their acts. \Vhen they take life or 
destroy p,roperty, they usually know what they 
are doing, and often choose means _singularly 
fitted to accomplish the end in ne\Y.' The true 
test is whether the defendant, at the tinze of the 
commission of the offense~ had the nzental capa-
city to know that in doing the act he u·as doing 
wrong. As w.as said in Haw v. State, 11 Neb. 
537, 10 N.\,T. 452, 38 .L~n1. Rep. 375: '.A .. nd "~here 
an individual lacks the n1ental capac.it~~ to distin-
guish right fron1 "~ron g. in reference to the par-
ticulnr act con1plained of, tl1e law will not hold 
him responsible'." 
In State YS. Green (decided February 9, 1935) 40 
P. 2d 961, 1~ehenring denied .. A ..pril 6, 1935, 86 L_Ttah 192, 
it i.s intr•rt'sting to note that eYen though defendant 
requested nn instrur:tion eontaining the "~ords Hhe did 
not kno"r it "~:n~ "~rong in the sense that s.uch act. \Ya.s 
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condemned by morals or law" the trial judge changed 
the language and submitted the case to th~ jury con-
taining the words "he did not know it was wrong in 
·the sense that such an act w.a,s condemned by morals 
and law.'' 
See al.so State vs. Hadley, (Utah 1925) 234 Pac. 
940, where the test is said to be whether defendant 
was "in such a mental state a:s to deprive him of the 
capacity to understand that the act committed consti-
tuted an offense and was wrong." 
It is interesting to not1e that Instruction No. 9, of 
which we here complain, includes the words "condemned 
by morals" but d·eprive:s them of their meaning by use 
of the conjunctive "or." So even here we have an implied 
recognition of the m·orality requirement in application 
of the right .and wrong test. 
We submit that in the great majority of cases dis-
cussing the right and wrong test the distinction between 
knowledge of the immorality of the act and knowledge 
of the illegality of the act is not discussed. Justice 
Cardozo's p•e·rsuasive opinion in the Schmidt Case, supra, 
remains as the leading authority on the subject. Numer-
ous courts, inferentially at least, are lined up with the 
Schmidt case, by the manner in whieh they state the 
right and wrong test. For example, see the following: 
McAllister vs. State 17 Ala., 434, 52 Am. Dec. 180; 
Bosell vs. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20: "against 
the laws of God and his country"; Blackburn vs. State, 
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23 Ohio St. 146: "ag.ainst the laws of God and man." 
State vs. Branto 33 Or. 533, 56 Pac. 268 "wrong and 
unlawful"; State vs. Brumfield, 104 Or. 506, 209 P. 120, 
"wrong and unl~awful"; Com. vs. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573, 
72 Atl. 893, "wrong and criminal"; Adair vs. State, 6 
Old. Cr. 284, 118 Pac. 416, "-competent to distinguish 
between right and wrong, or to understand the nature 
of the ;act he was committing." 
The modern trend of thought concerning the roll 
of moral understanding in application of the right and 
wrong test is clearly set forth in an annotation entitled 
"Modern Status of the M'Naghten "right and wrong" 
test of Criminal Responsibility" appearing -at 45 ALR 
(2) 1447, 1450 where the editor states: 
"It seems clear, however, in the light of cur-
rent medical and psychiatric information, that 
the ability to "know" right from wrong should 
no longer be presented to jury or witness in the 
exclusively intellectual sense in which that word 
has ordinarily been used in the application of 
the rule in the p.ast, but that tlze test should be 
the accused's abilit !J to enzotiouaUy and intellect-
ually realize and appreciate. as an integrated per-
sonality, th c nature a ud consequences of the moral 
choice presented, and that the n1ere ability to 
verbalize a correct ans,rer to questions about the 
distinction should not be aecepted a.s conclusive 
on the issue of crin1inal responsibility. And, by 
the san1e token, the tendency· of son1e of the courts 
to hold opinion testilnony on the question to the 
narrow issue of strictly intellectual capacity 
should be corrected, and experts should be per-
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mitted to make freely available to court and jury 
the benefit of their technical information upon 
the is:sue. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ~COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO' GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 3. 
Anticipruting the district attorney might claim that 
a verdict of not guilty would result in defendant being 
turned loose, defense counsel made the following request: 
Requested Instruction No. 3 
"The State of Utah has ~a mental hospital 
where patients who are suffering from mental 
illness may be incarcerated ,and treated for such 
time as is considered by a court of ·Competent 
jurisdiction to be necessary." (R. 266) 
The District Attorney did in fact state in his open-
ing argument to the jury: "Should you acquit him, 
he would be turned loose'' (R. 204). Again in his rebuttle 
argument Mr. Anderson belabored at great length the 
proposition that defendant would be turned loose if found 
not guilty by rea.son of insanity (R. 231, 232). 
The District Attorney's statement was made not as 
an opinion, but as a statement of the law governing 
the case. It was not founded on ·any evidence introduced 
by either party. Neither was it founded on any instruc-
tion of the court. Furthermore, it was incorrect and 
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m~sle.ading for two obvious re~asons. First, it carries 
the implication tluat the court would have no further 
jurisdiction over defendant after a not guilty verdict, 
and second that a not guilty verdict would result in 
defe·ndant's freedom. With reg~ard to the first inaccuracy 
we call attention to the procedure for determining 
whether an individual should be subjected to involuntary 
hospitalization in a mental institution as set forth at 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 64-7-36 (Sub-section G): 
"If, upon completion of the hearing and con-
sideration of the record, the court f:inds that the 
p·roposed patient (1) is mentally ill, and (2) he-
·cause of his illne.ss is likely to injure himself 
or others if allowed to remain at liberty * * * 
it shall order his hospitalization for an inde-
'terrninate period or for a temporary observational 
period not exceeding six months ; otherwise, it 
shall dismiss the proceedings." 
Fro1n the foregoing statute it is clear. that the 
District Court has jurisdiction to determine "'\Yhet.her a 
mentally ill person is likely to injure hin1self or others 
and may upon a proper sho"-ing:~ order that a person 
be incarcerated in the state 1nental hospital for .an in-
deternlinate period "~hieh 1nay be for life... It is our 
belief that juries haYe great faith in our judicial syste1u. 
If this jury had kno"'\Yn of the existen{~e of the foregoing 
court procedure in detern1ining "'\Yhether an indiYidual 
should hP ]neareerated in the state 1nental ho.spit.al they 
would have hnd utn1ost eonfidenee that defendant would 
not have bePn turned loose by the court. They "~ould 
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have realized thwt the court could, and unquestionably 
would have protected soci1ety against such an eventuality. 
This brings us to the second inaccuracy of the District 
Attorney's strutement. We are confident that the District 
Court would not have turned defendant loose on a 
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Nelson's 
testimony regarding the severe mental illness from which 
defendant is suffering and his inability to refrain from 
anti-social behavior should set the mrutter forever at 
rest. In this connection we also call attention to a number 
of cases holding that a court in determining whether 
one charged with insanity is likely to injure himself 
or others may consider the history of that individual 
including any homicide he has committed. 
See in this connection Orencia vs. Overholsen (Dis-
trict of Columbia 1947) 163 F. (2) 763, where it is held 
that where insanity has been responsible for murder, 
evidence must be such as to make the court reasonably 
certain that the p.atient has been restored to mental 
health before discharge \vill be justified. See also Barry 
vs. White 64 F. (2) 707; People Ex Rel Thaw vs. Lamb, 
118 NYS 389; in re Ostatter 103 Kan. 487, 175 Pac. 
377; in re Palmer 26 R.I. 486, 59 Atl. 7 46. 
Nevertheless the jury was here led to believe that 
no further proceeding would be had in the event of a 
not guilty verdict, and that in the event of a not guilty 
verdict defendant would be turned loose. 
The cases uniformly hold that it is error for a 
prosecuting attorney to misst1ate the law of the c.ase 
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in his argument. See State vs. O'Keefe, 23 Nev. 127, 43 
P~ac. 918. It is also error for a p·rosecuting attorney to 
miss:tate the facts. See State vs. Martinez (Utah 1920) 
191 Pac. 214 where the di.strict attorney stated in his 
argument that defendant had .admitted he fired the 
shot that killed decedent and the record revealed that 
the defendant had never made such an admission. Like-
wise, it is error for a p·rosecuting attorney to appeal to 
the passion or prejudice of the jury regarding extraneous 
matters.. See Robinson vs. U. S. (CCAS) 32 F (2) 505 
where in a prosecution of a government prohibition 
agent for accepting a bribe, the court held that it was 
reversible error for the prosecuting attorney to state 
that a failure to convict would impair the efficiency 
of agents employed in the government service and 
would result in irreparable injury to the public. In 
Bunell vs. State (Tex.) 138 S.W. 707, the court held 
that it was reversible err.or for the trial court to refuse 
to instruct the jury ·to disregard statements of the prose-
cuting attorney in his argument that if the jury did 
not convict they Inight as well "ipe the local option 
law off the statute book and tear do\\--n the courthouse. 
In Oakley vs. State (Tex. 1934) 68 S.\\T. (2) 204 an 
argument by the prosecution containing a misstatement 
somewltat similar to that in the case at bar 'yas held 
to be reversible error. 
'•It is con·t.ended by the appellant, and we 
think correctly so, that this argument """as a 
dirPct ap·peal to religious prejudice and calculated 
to arouse the e1notions and disregard the charge 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
of the court and the testimony ~authorizing .an 
acquittal :even if he was insane at the time of 
. the commission of the offense. The argument 
was ·an :appeal to the jury to convict him of 
murder because, if they acquitted him and turned 
him loose, a ju:cy in the county court may find 
him .sane; besides the district ,and county at-
torneys could not stand before one jury one day 
and contend that he was sane .and the next day 
stand before another jury and plead that he 
was insane. The further argument that, if the jury 
convicted him .and he was insane, they could get 
a writ of habeas corpus and get him out of the· 
penitentiary, was an appeal to the jury to dis-
regard their oath and shift their responsibility 
of determining whether he was insane at the time 
of the commission of the offense." 
See also W eige vs. State (Tex. 1917) 196 S.W. 524 
where the following argument w.as held to be reversible 
error: 
"Gentlemen, you can go out and find this 
defendant guilty of murder and send him to the 
penitentiary, and the law is, if you send him to 
the p·enitentiary, he and his folks can call for 
a trial charging him with lunacy in the county 
court, and put him in the asylum if the jury 
find he was insane, because you cannot put an 
insane man in the penitentiary; but if you should 
turn him loose, how do you know he will ever 
be tried for. insanity, :and he might go back up 
where he live.s and do the same thing over again, 
or kill his children." 
In Estepp vs. Commonwealth 185 Ky. 156, 214 S.W. 
891 it was declared highly improper for a prosecuting 
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attorney to go outside the record in an attempt to in-
fluence the jury by stating that unle~ss the maximun1 
penalty was inflicted defendant might escape sentence 
in part by being parolled. In State vs. Little, 228 N.C. 
417, 45 S.E. ( 2) 542 it was held th,at the solicitor's 
statement to the jury that if defendant were convicted 
there would he an app.eal and in event the decision of 
the lower court should be affirmed there would he an 
ap·p~eal to the governor to commute the sentence and that 
no more than 60% of prisoners convicted of capital 
offenses were ever executed constituted reversible error 
as relating to matters not included in ·evidence. See 
also Smith vs. State (Tex. 1909) 117 S.\\T. 966. 
Whether the court's error in refusing to correct the 
misstatement of the district attorney was p;:rejudicial 
depends on whether it likely affected the jury's deliber.a-
tions. In this connection we call attention to the facts. 
Here is a defendant who because of a se\ere mental 
illness has killed two people "ithout motive, without 
remorse and without conscience. Because of his mental 
condition it is likelY that if freed he would again commit 
• L 
an anti-social act. This is particularly true unle.ss he 
undergoes treatn1ent for his condition "\Yhich Dr. Nelson 
described as inpatient treat1nent consisting of the slow 
process of relearning oyer a period of years, sonle-
what as a ehild is taught fron1 infancy to 1naturity 
(R. 1 ()-l-). No jury is going to conte1nplate "\Yith favor 
turning a erilninally insane person loose under such 
eiren1ustane-Ps. They nnquestionabl~~ "\Vould have an en-
tirely different attitude about a verdict of not guilty 
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by reason of insanity which would result in a further 
hearing and a fair determination by the court of de-
fendant's mental illness ,and likelihood of injuring some-
body. With that assurance they could consider the ques-
tion of defendant's legal sanity solely on its merit. The 
refusal of the court 'to clarify the law concerning this 
matter placed defense counsel in the anomalous position 
where added proof of mental illness would diminish 
rather than increase their chance of a not guilty verdict. 
The more severe defendant's mental illness the more 
abhorent the thought of turning him loose. The jury 
unquestionably believed the District Attorney when he 
told them that a verdict of guilty would be the only 
obstacle to defendant's freedom. They believed him be-
cause of hi.s position as a public servant. They believed 
him because the court, although urged to correct his 
misstatement of the lavv, refused to do so, and by its 
silence lent tacit approval to what he had said. (See 
the exception taken by defense counsel to refusal of 
the trial court to give its requested instruction No. 3 
at Record 240, 241.) Believing that the only way to avoid 
turning defendant loose was to find him guilty they 
found him guilty. The probability i.s that the defense of 
insanity was never even considered by the jury. Their 
concern was for the future of society and they believed 
themselves to be the sole and only obstacle in the path 
of defendant's freedom. This could be the only possible 
rationale for the cruel and inhuman verdict which did 
not recommend leniency for an eighteen year old youth 
concededly suffering from a severe mental illness. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is our position that this court should grant de-
fendant a new trial for two basic and important reasons. 
First, the trial court by instructing the jury that defend-
ant was legally sane if he knew that murder is against 
the law, and by eliminating the requirement that defend~ 
ant understand the moral implications of his conduct 
has redueed the defense of insanity to a sham. If a man 
can be held morally accountable and subject to punish-
ment for an act which he does not comprehend and 
understand to be morally wrong, then our great pro-
gress of recent_ years toward an understanding of mental 
illness in all of its various forms has been confined 
to the medical profession and has utterly escaped the 
learned profession of the law. 
The second proposition involves basic concepts of 
fairness and justice. We appreciate the fact that when 
two people have innocently n1et death at the hands of 
another, society as a ·w .. hole becomes inflamed and biased 
to a certain degree against the perpetrator of that of-
fense. This is true regardless of ''l1ether or not the 
defendant is mentally responsible for his acts. Therefore 
it is of uttnost importance that the trial oourt be vigilant 
in guarding agains1t any appeal to passion on the part 
of the prosecuting attorney. Here a duly elected officer 
of the })('OJ)h:• advised the jury that a. verdict of not 
guilty hy rea8on of insanity would turn defendant loose. 
This statetnent "\v·as absolutely erroneous and it cast 
before the jury· the gr.ueson1e prospect, if they found 
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defendant not guilty, of turning loose a criminally insane 
person on society. The mere denial of such fact by de-
fense oounsel eould not eliminate the prejudice:. The only 
possibility of restoring the jury to a rational consider-
ation of the insanity issue was for the trial court to 
give a cautionary ins~truction setting the record straight 
as to the manner in which defendant's future would be 
determined if he were found not guilty by reason of 
in.sanity. When the court refused to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 3 it was only to be expected 
that the jury would consider their duty to society para-
mount to their duty to defendant and would find him 
guilty, and they would do ·so irrespective of whether 
they believed his warped and distorted mind was capa-
ble of comprehending the moral wrong that he had com-
mitted. 
It is our further hope that this honorable court will 
meet the challenge pre.sented by our ever broadening 
knowledge of defects and diseases of the mind, and will 
review in its entirety our present legal standards for 
determining sanity. It is a well known fact that Mc-
N.aghten's right and wrong test is obsolete and outmoded. 
It is as outmoded as the so-called wild-bea.st test which 
it superseded. See Rex vs. Arnold, 16 Howard State 
Trials 695. This court would not be without p·recedent in 
adopting such a course. The United States ~c·ourt of 
Appeals, District of Columbi~a Circuit, ha.s pointed the 
way in Durham vs. United States, 214 F. (2d) 862. The 
Durham case recognizes the humanitarian precept that 
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"our collective conscience does not allow punishment 
where it cannot impose blame." Its criticism of the right 
and wrong test is two-fold. First, it does not take suffi-
cient account of p_sychic realities and scientific knowl-
edge, and, second, it is based upon one symptom so can-
not validly be applied in all circumstances. The Durham 
case adopts the enlightened rule that where there is 
some evidence of mental disease or defect, in order to 
convict, the jury must find either (1) that the accused 
was not suffering from a mental defect or disease, or 
(2) that even if he was, the criminal act was not the 
p,roduct of that condition. In determining those issues 
the jury is given the broad discretion of examining every 
facet of the accused's mental condition, not just the 
tiny compartment where his capability of understanding 
right from wrong resides. 
We re.spectfully subn1it that for the errors pointed 
out in this brief defendant should be granted a new 
trial, and that this eourt should go a step further and 
adopt in substance the rule of the Du rlza1n case, supra, 
for a ne"'" trial in this ease and for future use in the 
State of 1Ttah. 
Respectfully _subnritted, 
''r .A .. YNE L. BLA,CI~ 
L ... \~fAR DlTNC .. :\.N 
Counsel fo~r Defendant 
and .Appellant 
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